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Takings Analysis of Police Destruction of Innocent Owners'
Property in the Course of Law Enforcement: The View
from Five State Supreme Courts
Charles E. Cohen*
I. INTRODUCTION
When police officers destroy the property of innocent people in the course of
authorized law enforcement activities, intuitive notions of fairness suggest that
the property owners should be made whole by the government. Yet the Iowa
Supreme Court's decision in Kelley v. Story County Sheriff' solidified a trend
against such compensation. In fact, the Kelley court became the third state
supreme court to deny recovery under the state constitutional just compensation
clause for police destruction of innocent people's property. The previous two
courts to so hold were the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Sullivant v. City of
Oklahoma City2 and the California Supreme Court in Customer Co. v. City of
Sacramento.3 Two other state supreme courts held that plaintiffs might recover
under takings theories. The Texas Supreme Court, in Steele v. City of Houston,4
held that police destruction could amount to a taking under the Texas
Constitution, but it remanded with instructions that a showing of "great public
necessity" would be a defense.5 Only the Minnesota Supreme Court, in Wegner v.
Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co.,6 allowed recovery under a takings theory,
notwithstanding the possibility that there may have been a public necessity underlying
the police actions at issue.
In each of these cases, innocent property owners claimed to have suffered
intentional destruction of their property by government agents, and each owner
relied, at least in part, on his state's just compensation clause. Yet despite the fact
that the constitutional provisions at issue were nearly identical in wording,7 these
* B.A., 1987, Harvard University; J.D., 1999, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
The author wishes to thank Colin Crawford, David 1. Levine and Leo Martinez for their support and
encouragement.
1. 611 N.W.2d 475 (Iowa 2000).
2. 940 P.2d 220 (Okla. 1997).
3. 895 P.2d 900 (Cal. 1995).
4. 603 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1980).
5. Id.
6. 479 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1991).
7. See Wegner, 479 N.W.2d at 41 (noting that the taking provision of the Texas Constitution "is
virtually identical to the Minnesota taking provision"); Customer Co., 895 P.2d at 912 (describing the just
compensation provisions of the Minnesota and Texas Constitutions as "similar to our section 19"); Sullivant,
940 P.2d at 226 (noting that "New Jersey, Minnesota and Texas all have constitutional provisions which are
2002 / Takings Analysis of Police Destruction of Innocent Owners' Property
courts essentially split into two camps: one flatly refusing recovery on the ground that
the police actions were not exercises of eminent domain, and the other allowing
recovery by holding that destructive police actions could be takings under certain
circumstances.
If, as one scholar has declared, "[t]hroughout constitutional jurisprudence, only the
right of privacy can compete seriously with takings law for the doctrine-in-most-
desperate-need-of-a-principle prize,' 8 no collection of cases better demonstrates
the point. Of the five courts deciding the cases discussed in this article, only the
Iowa Supreme Court was able to articulate a coherent explanation for its holding.
Although all of the courts purported to rely on precedent and the policies
underlying the Takings Clause, none of the courts was able to explain convincingly
why one policy should be favored over another. To be fair, this is no surprise. The
United States Supreme Court has itself acknowledged that its approach to takings
cases has been "essentially ad hoc."
9
I believe that the courts which denied recovery in these cases reached the better
result, but not for the reasons emphasized by those courts.1° The most important
principles underlying the requirement of just compensation-the protection of a
property-owning minority from majoritarian redistributivism, the guarding of
stability within the economic and political system, and the deterrence of arbitrary
government-are not implicated under the facts of these cases. Instead, the
principles underlying the line of Supreme Court takings cases dealing with
emergencies, including National Board of Young Men's Christian Associations
(YMCA) v. United States1' and United States v. Caltex, lnc.12 seem more
applicable. Because the decisions to take the plaintiffs' property were not the
result of collective deliberation, because the government gained no resources as a
result of the police officers' acts, and because the police officers' actions were at
least partly intended to benefit the plaintiffs, the policy considerations weigh
against compensation.
In Part II of this article, I discuss the decisions in the five police destruction
cases. In Part III, I briefly sketch the relevant principles and policies of takings law.
In Part IV, I critique the five state supreme court decisions in light of the principles
and policies discussed in Part III.
similar to Art. 2, § 24"). The California constitutional provision at issue in Customer Co. was "almost identical
in meaning to Art. 2, § 24." Id. at 41 n.3.
8. Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1081 (1993). Another observed that it has become
clichd to portray takings law "as a hopelessly confused welter of conflicting precedents." Robert L. Glicksman,
Making a Nuisance of Takings Law, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 149, 149 (2000).
9. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
10. Two other authors who have examined these cases have reached alternate conclusions. See C.
Wayne Owen, Jr., Note, Everyone Benefits, Everyone Pays: Does the Fifth Amendment Mandate Compensation
When Property is Damaged During the Course of Police Activities?, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 277 (2000);
Lior J. Strahilevitz, Case Note, When the Taking ltself is Just Compensation, 107 YALE L.J. 1975 (1998).
11. 395 U.S. 85 (1969).
12. 344 U.S. 149 (1952).
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II. THE POLICE DESTRUCTION CASES: COMPETING THEORIES
A. Steele v. City of Houston: The Possibility of a Taking
In Steele, Houston police officers were accused of intentionally burning
down the plaintiffs' house in order to capture escaped prisoners hiding inside.'
3
The plaintiffs sued the city under tort and takings theories. The latter theory was
premised on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, 1 4 and article I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution which provides
in relevant part that "[n]o person's property shall be taken, damaged, or destroyed
for or applied to public use, without adequate compensation being made, unless
by the consent of such person; and, when taken, except for the use of the State,
such compensation shall be first made, or secured by a deposit of money."'
' 5
Although two lower courts denied recovery under the takings theory, the Texas
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action
under article I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution for destruction of their property.'
6
Nonetheless, the court indicated that a showing of "great public necessity" on remand
would bar the plaintiffs' recovery.
Although the court did not set forth its reasoning with great precision, it appears
that the Texas justices were moved by several factors. First, the court was
obviously influenced by the often-quoted language from the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Armstrong v. United States,'7 observing that the
Takings Clause was meant "to bar Government from forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole."' 18 The Texas court referred to the Armstrong principle as
"[t]he underlying basis" for the just compensation requirement. 9 Second, the
court noted that its recent decisions had refused to differentiate between exercises
of police power and eminent domain and that it had "moved beyond the earlier
notion that the government's duty to pay for taking property rights is excused by
labeling the taking as an exercise of police powers. '20 Third, the court concluded
that the plaintiffs' claim was not based on tort theory, which, under the court's
precedent, would preclude recovery under the just compensation clause.2' Fourth,
the court stated that the requisite public use could be established by proof that the
Houston officers had ordered destruction of the house "because of real or
13. 603 S.W.2d at 788. The officers were accused of both intentionally starting the fire and preventing
the fire department from putting it out.
14. Id.
15. TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 17.
16. Steele, 603 S.W.2d at 788.
17. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
18. Id. at 49.
19. Steele, 603 S.W.2d at 789 (quoting Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49).
20. Id.
21. ld. at 791-92.
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supposed public emergency [in order] to apprehend armed and dangerous men
[inside]. 22 Then, the court stated that on remand the city could defend itself on
the grounds of "great public necessity., 23 However, the court stressed, "[m]ere
convenience will not suffice., 24 The court then set forth passages from Professors
Prosser and Nichols discussing the policies underlying the "public necessity"
defense to a takings claim.
25
B. Wegner v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co.: A Taking on Equitable Grounds
In Wegner, Minneapolis police surrounded the plaintiff's house after fleeing
felons previously unknown to the plaintiff broke in and hid inside.26 When
attempts to communicate with the barricaded suspects failed, the police launched
27twenty-five rounds of tear gas and three concussion grenades into the house.
The assault broke virtually every window in the house, damaged interior walls,
and left a pink film on the walls and furniture.28 The plaintiff sued the city,
alleging trespass and a compensable taking under article I, section 13 of the
Minnesota Constitution.29 Section 13 provides that "[p]rivate property shall not
,,30be taken, destroyed or damaged for public use without just compensation.
Both the trial court and the court of appeals rejected the takings claim, but the
Minnesota Supreme Court reversed.3'
First, the court mentioned the Armstrong principle and quoted its famous
language. 32 Next, the court stated that "simply labeling the actions of the police
as an exercise of the police power 'cannot justify the disregard of the
constitutional inhibitions."'' 33 The court indicated that it was influenced by the
Steele decision, particularly on the issues of police power, governmental
immunity, and public use.34 The opinion rejected any suggestion that a taking
22. Id. at 792.
23. Id. According to Professor Prosser:
[w]here the danger affects the entire community, or so many people that the public interest is
involved, that interest serves as a complete justification to the defendant who acts to avert the
peril to all.... It would seem that the moral obligation upon the group affected to make
compensation in such a case should be recognized by the law, but recovery usually has been
denied.
Id. (quoting PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 24 (4th ed. 1971)).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 792 & n.2.




30. MINN. CONST. art 1, § 13.
31. Wegner, 479 N.W.2d at 39.
32. Id. at 40.
33. Id. (quoting In re Dreosch, 47 N.W.2d 106, 111 (195 1)).
34. Id. at 40-41.
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must occur in connection with a public improvement project in order to be
compensable under the state's just compensation clause.35 Finally, the court
stated it was "not inclined to allow the city to defend [itself on the basis] of
public necessity" because compensating the plaintiff was required by "basic
notions of fairness and justice. 36
C. Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento: A Categorical Limitation to Exercises
of Eminent Domain
In Customer Co., Sacramento police officers surrounded a convenience store
in order to capture a fugitive who was inside.37 After the suspect ignored orders
to come out, a prolonged standoff culminated in the firing of canisters of tear gas
through the store's plate glass windows.38 By the time the officers made their
arrest, they had caused $275,000 in damage to the store, a sum that included
$90,000 for hazardous waste handling of inventory contaminated by the gas.39
Rather than bring an action for negligence under the state's Tort Claims Act, the
store's owner asserted an inverse condemnation theory40 under article I, section
19 of the California Constitution, which provides in relevant part: "Private
property may be taken or damaged for public use only when just compensation,
ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, or into court for, the
owner."'41 The plaintiff contended that its property had been "damaged for public
use."
42
The California Supreme Court rejected the inverse condemnation theory. The
court's majority concluded that article I, section 19 "never was intended, and
never has been interpreted, to impose a constitutional obligation upon the government
to pay 'just compensation' whenever a governmental employee commits an act
that causes loss of private property."43 Instead, the majority asserted, the clause
was "concerned, most directly, with the state's exercise of its traditional eminent
domain power."" The court stated that while the just compensation requirement
had "been extended, in limited circumstances-beyond its traditional context
involving the taking or damaging of private property in connection with public
35. Id. at 41.
36. Id. at 42.
37. 895 P.2d at 902.
38. Id. at 903-04.
39. Id. at 904.
40. As the court noted, "An inverse condemnation action is an eminent domain proceeding initiated by
the property owner rather than the condemner. The principals which affect the parties' right in an inverse
condemnation suit are the same as those in an eminent domain action." Id. at 905 n.4 (citations omitted).
41. CAL. CONST. art I, § 19. The plaintiff did not assert a claim under the Fifth Amendment to the
federal Constitution. Customer Co., 895 P.2d at 905 n.2.
42. Customer Co., 895 P.2d at 906.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 905.
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improvement projects-to encompass government regulations that constitute the
functional equivalent of an exercise of eminent domain, section 19" had never been
invoked to require the compensation of a property owner for damage done by
police officers trying to enforce the law. 45 "On the contrary," the majority
explained, "such property damage, like any personal injury caused by the same
type of public employee activity, has-throughout the entire history of section
19-been recoverable, if at all, under general tort principles, principles that
always have been understood to be subject to control and regulation of the
Legislature. 46
The court cited its 1929 decision Miller v. City of Palo Alto4 7 in holding that
there could be no recovery because the "public use" requirement had not been
met. In Miller, the plaintiff's property was destroyed by a fire allegedly caused
by the city's negligence. 48 The plaintiff sought recovery based, in part, on an
inverse condemnation theory, arguing that his "property had been 'damaged' by
an activity of the public entity conducted for the public benefit. 49 The Miller
court rejected this theory because the "public use" requirement had not been
met.50 The court recited the following definition of public use:
A public use is "a use which concerns the whole community as distinguished
from a particular individual or a particular number of individuals; public
usefulness, utility or advantage; or what is productive of general benefit; a
use by or for the government, the general public or some portion of it."'"
Finally, the court sought to dispel "[a]ny doubt" that its rejection of the
inverse condemnation claim was correct by citing cases applying the "emergency
exception" to the requirement of compensation for takings. The court described
this exception as "a specific application of the general rule that damage to, or even
destruction of, property pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power
often.... works not only damage to property but destruction of property., 53 More
specifically, the court explained the doctrine by quoting from an earlier decision
which stated that:
In such cases calling for immediate action the emergency constitutes
full justification for the measures taken to control the menacing
condition, and private interests must be held wholly subservient to
45. Id. at 905-06.
46. Id. at 906.
47. 280 P. 108 (Cal. 1929).
48. Customer Co., 895 P.2d at 908 (citing Miller, 280 P. at 108).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. (citation omitted).
52. Id. at 909.
53. Id.
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the right of the state to proceed in such manner as it deems
appropriate for the protection of the public health or safety.
5 4
The court also cited in passing two United States Supreme Court decisions
exemplifying the emergency exception, Caltex, Inc. and United States v. Pacific
Railroad,55 and concluded that the need for police officers to respond to
emergency situations "unhampered by the specter of constitutionally mandated
liability for resulting damage to private property" required that recovery under an
inverse condemnation theory be denied.56
The court noted that allowing the plaintiff to proceed under a constitutional
takings theory would allow it to avoid the procedural requirements of the state's
Tort Claims Act and, if successful, would allow recovery of attorneys' fees,
which the Tort Claims Act did not allow. The court observed that in the absence
of a showing of negligence, the plaintiff might be eligible for compensation from
the state's victim's compensation statutes, "which specifically authorize cities
and counties to establish reimbursement programs for damage to the property of
'innocent residents' caused by peace officers engaged in detecting crime or
apprehending suspects."
57
Justice Kennard filed a concurring opinion criticizing the majority's
methodology.58 She proposed the simple solution of basing the denial of
compensation on the "public use" requirement of section 19. 59 She explained that
"[h]ere, the police did not, in any meaningful sense of the word, use the store
windows that they broke or the food and beverages that they contaminated with
tear gas."6 °
Justice Baxter dissented. He rejected the majority's conclusion that section
19 was limited to damages arising from public improvements, stating that the
section, by its plain language, was not so limited.6' The fact that the California
cases involving section 19 only spoke in terms of public improvements did not
mean that section 19 could only apply to public improvements. Since these cases
dealt with public improvements, it made sense that their holdings would be given
in that context.62 He argued that the policies and purposes behind the just
compensation clause, and not arbitrary categories, should govern, and then put
forth an equitable argument, quoting Armstrong, about the unfairness of requiring
the property owner alone to bear the cost of the police actions.63 Finally, he
54. Customer Co., 895 P.2d at 910 (citation omitted).
55. 120 U.S. 227 (1887).
56. Customer Co., 895 P.2d at 911.
57. Id. at 916 (citing sections 29631, 29632, and 29636 of the California Government Code).
58. Id. at 917 (Kennard, J., concurring).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 925 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
62. Customer Co., 895 P.2d at 926.
63. Id. at 927 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
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rejected the argument that the emergency exception should excuse compensation
on the ground that this doctrine "was limited to certain kinds of true emergency,
' 64
and that the police destruction of the plaintiff's property was not a "true emergency"
because the government actors here had "helped precipitate the crisis. 65 The dissent
rejected the concurrence's contention that no "public use" had been established,
arguing that a public use occurred because the damage had been inflicted on behalf
of the community by public employees for the public welfare.66
D. Sullivant v. City of Oklahoma City: Another Categorical Approach
In Sullivant, police officers, exercising a valid search warrant, damaged the
doors of an apartment unit owned by the plaintiff landlord.67 The landlord sought
recovery under both tort and state constitutional taking theories. 68 The constitutional
theory was based on article 2, section 24 of the Oklahoma Constitution, which
provides in relevant part that "[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged
for public use without just compensation., 69 The court denied recovery under
article 2, section 24 for three reasons. First, the court held that article 2, section
24 applied only to "condemnation proceedings, where real property is actually
taken and used for a public project. 7° Second, the court held that section 24 does
not permit recovery for torts committed by government employees. 71 Third, the
court concluded that the actions in question constituted proper exercise of the
police power, specifically the power to damage or destroy property to protect
public health and safety, and therefore did not require compensation under the
72 7court's prior cases. The court noted the decisions in Wallace v. Atlantic City,73
Wegner, and Steele, but stated that it found the decisions in Customer Co. and
other cases denying recovery "more in accord with our construction of [a]rt. 2,
[section] 24 and the relevant decisional authority., 74 The court noted that it found
two arguments from Customer Co. particularly persuasive: (1) permitting
recovery might deter police from doing their job, and (2) the damage was not a
"use" of the property.75
64. Id. at 929.
65. Id. at 924, 935.
66. Id. at 930.
67. 940 P.2d at 222.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 224 (quoting article 2, section 24 of the Oklahoma Constitution). Plaintiff also relied on an
Oklahoma statute, 27 O.S. 1991 § 16, but the court dismissed this assertion out of hand, noting that the "statute
is limited to the acquisition of real property for public use in a project or program using state, federal or local
funds," and was thus "expressly inapplicable." Id. at 224 n.2 (citing 27 O.S. § 9).
70. Id. at 224.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 224-25.
73. 608 A.2d 480 (N.J. Super. Law Div. 1992).
74. Sullivant, 940 P.2d at 226.
75. Id. at 226-27.
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E. Kelley v. Story County Sheriff: A Nuanced Approach
In Kelley, Story County Sheriff's officers damaged two doors while
executing an arrest warrant at a rented home. 6 The landlord plaintiff filed a small
claims action against the county and the sheriff.7  After the small claims court
found the officers immune under chapter 670 of the Iowa Code, Municipal Tort
Claims Act, Kelley appealed to the district court.7 a The district court denied
recovery on a takings theory premised on article I, section 18 of the Iowa
Constitution,79 concluding that the acts Kelley complained of were tortious rather
than an exercise of eminent domain. 0 The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed.8'
The court noted that the facts before it did not fit neatly into other categories
of takings cases, such as invasion, occupation, or regulation.8 2 The court then
noted that it had distinguished between eminent domain actions (requiring
compensation) and police power actions (not requiring compensation).8 3 It noted that
its own 1913 decision in Waud v. Crawfordt4 explained that the destruction of
property in an emergency to protect the public was within the police power.
8 5
However, the court went on to explain that exercises of police power could
sometimes work a taking if the interference with an owner's property rights was
great enough.86 This determination is made on a case-by-case basis by employing
a balancing test that "asks whether the collective benefits of the regulatory action
outweigh the restraint imposed upon the property owner., 87 The court concluded
that the destruction at issue was an exercise of the police power because it fell
within section 804.15 of the Iowa Code, which authorizes a police officer to use
"reasonably necessary" force to make an arrest.8 8 The court then concluded that
the county's interest in protecting its citizens outweighed any impact on the
76. 611 N.W.2d at 477.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. IOWA CONST. art 1, § 18 provides in relevant part:
Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation first being made,
or secured to be made to the owner thereof, as soon as the damages shall be assessed by a jury,
who shall not take into consideration any advantages that may result to said owner on account
of the improvement for which it is taken.
80. Kelley, 611 N.W.2d. at 477-78. It is unclear whether Kelley raised his constitutional theory before
the small claims court.
81. ld. at 477.
82. Id. at 479.
83. Id.
84. 141 N.W. 1041 (Iowa 1913).
85. Kelley, 611 N.W.2d at 479 (quoting Waud, 141 N.W. at 1041).
86. Id. at 480.
87. Id. (citations omitted).
88. Id. at481.
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plaintiff's property and that the plaintiff was required to bear some cost for the
good of the public.89
III. THE BACKGROUND ON TAK1NGS
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part:
"[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation."90
Courts and scholars have been famously unsuccessful in developing a coherent
framework for application of this brief passage from the Bill of Rights. 9'
Although the historical record of the Framers' intent regarding the Takings
Clause is exceedingly limited, 92 a few themes have emerged. William Treanor
argued that the Takings Clause was designed to protect possession of real
property against the political majority's redistributive impulses.93 His research
concluded that in colonial America the political process alone determined when
compensation was due for government acts that affected property rights. 94 As late
as the time of the drafting of the Fifth Amendment, even outright physical
seizures of property did not by constitutional edict automatically entitle property
owners to compensation. In those few colonial charters that explicitly protected
property, the protection was in the form of a "requirement of procedural
regularity," 95 which was obtained before a jury or the legislature, each being, in
Treanor's words, a "majoritarian decisionmaking body" and thus subject to the
iniquities of the political process.96 Typically, however, colonial governments
took real or personal property without compensation.97 Where statutes required
compensation, they typically did so only for improved or enclosed land.98 New York
limited compensation to takings of improved or enclosed land or else it required
the private beneficiaries of the taking to provide compensation.99
89. Id.
90. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Most state constitutions contain "just compensation" provisions similar to
the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, while about half the state constitutions provide additionally for
compensation when property is "damaged," as opposed to simply "taken," for public use. See PHILIP NICHOLS,
THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.02[1], 6-30 (3d ed. 1998).
91. See generally William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, the Narratives of Takings, and
Compensation Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1151, 1151 (1997) [hereinafter Treanor 11] (describing the
incoherence of takings jurisprudence).
92. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political
Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 790-91 (1995) [hereinafter Treanor 1]; Rubenfeld, supra note 8, at 1081;
Roger Clegg, Reclaiming the Text of the Takings Clause, 46 S.C. L. REV. 531, 539-40 (1995).
93. Treanor 1, supra note 92, at 786.
94. Id. at 785.
95. Id. at 786.
96. Id. at 787.
97. Id. at 787-88.
98. William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 582 (1972).
99. MORTON J. HORwITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 63 (1977).
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Moreover, none of the state constitutions adopted in 1776 required just
compensation for seizures of property.100 The only revolutionary era documents
containing just compensation clauses-the Vermont Constitution of 1777, the
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787-
applied by their plain terms only to physical appropriation of property.1 '
Treanor argued that the Takings Clause was a product of Republican ideology,
which "accorded the institution of private property a high degree of respect and
protection because it provided the autonomy necessary for citizenship."' 1 2 James
Madison, the primary advocate for the Takings Clause among the Framers of the
Constitution, focused on protecting possession rather than value-not because of
a limited conception of property. 0 3 Instead, according to Treanor, the Framers'
generation generally believed that majoritarian bodies such as legislatures would
protect property rights, except for "a small class of cases in which property
concerns would not be fairly considered, and that a compensation rule was
necessary for that class."' 0 4 The narrow class included cases of military
impressments of personal property during wartime. 105 Madison "believed that
physical property needed greater protection than other forms of property because its
owners were peculiarly vulnerable to majoritarian decisionmaking.' ' 10 6 Thus, according
to Treanor, the original understanding of the Takings Clause was that it applied only
when the government physically took property, and not to other government acts
that diminished or destroyed the value of property. 1
07
Joseph Sax's examination of the seventeenth and eighteenth century legal
scholars, whose views were the "direct antecedents" of the federal Just Compensation
Clause, concluded that the primary concern underlying the compensation
principle was "not the fact of loss but the imposition of loss by unjust means,"1
0 8
specifically, through "arbitrary or tyrannical treatment."' 1 9 The early writers often
cited the example of impressments of property in wartime by the army without
compensation. According to Sax, "[i]t was only for the losses sustained in such
circumstances that compensation was thought to be required."" 0  The underlying
concern was appropriation by the state "to finance its own enterprise[,]"' "the
100. See Treanor I, supra note 92, at 786-87.
101. Id. at 790-91.
102. Id. at 825.
103. Id. at 818.
104. Id. at 832,836.
105. Id. at 835-36.
106. Id. at 847.
107. Id. at 798.
108. Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 57 (1964).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 59.
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threat of the state's becoming the direct economic beneficiary of its own legislative
acts."
1 12
Even the limited property protections intended by the Fifth Amendment far
exceeded those available on the state level. As late as 1820, the majority of states
had no just compensation provisions in their constitutions, although all except
South Carolina had enacted statutes providing for compensation.13 One
commentator attributes the lack of constitutional just compensation provisions at
the turn of the nineteenth century to "a perhaps dominant body of opinion
maintaining that individuals held their property at the sufferance of the state."
'1 14
This view eventually shifted. In the first half of the nineteenth century, states
increasingly added just compensation provisions to their constitutions. 1 5 By mid-
century, the prevailing view favored mandatory compensation, largely out of fear
that the eminent domain power might be used for wholesale redistribution of
wealth. 
116
Subsequently, however, courts began adopting rules of law that dramatically
limited the compensation for damages arising from public works projects. 1 7 This
was accomplished by distinguishing between "immediate" and "consequential"
injuries, with the ultimate result that compensation was required only for injures
caused by direct trespass or appropriation for public use. 118 In the absence of a
physical invasion or taking, damages resulting from a nearby public improvement
were considered damnum absque injuria. According to Morton J. Horwitz, these
limitations were the work of instrumentalist judges seeking to force property
owners to subsidize the cost of public improvements. 1 9 When the industrial
revolution brought an explosion of economic activity and increased population
density, the frequency with which public improvements resulted in indirect
damage to private property increased. 120 Beginning in Illinois in 1870, states
began amending their just compensation clauses to require compensation for
damage as well as for takings, thus abandoning the direct physical injury
requirement. 12 1 Today about half of the states' constitutions contain such a
provision.
12 2
112. Id. at 59-60.
113. See HORWITZ, supra note 99, at 64.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 66.
116. Id. See also Stoebuck, supra note 98, at 555 (stating that the enactment of constitutional eminent
domain clauses reflected "an existing ethos shared by judges along with constitution makers.").
117. See HORWITZ, supra note 99, at 72.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 70-71.
120. See NICHOLS, supra note 90, at § 6.02[2].
121. Id. § 6.02[1].
122. Id. § 6.02[1] n.15; see H. Dixon Montague & Billy Coe Dyer, Compensability of Nonphysical
Impacts of Public Works: A Game of Chance, 34 URB. LAW. 171, 172 n. 10 (2002).
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Countermajoritarianism remains an animating principle in takings jurisprudence
and scholarship.1 23 But even accepting the Madisonian view that property ownership
is an essential attribute of our democratic society-and therefore deserving
constitutional protection from majoritarian redistributivism-govemment's very
nature is to "adjust[] the benefits and burdens of economic life,"' 24 which must
include regulation of property.125 How, then, is one to determine which
governmental limitations or exactions go too far? Or, as one commentator has
questioned, "[w]hich resources should be treated as crucial to personal well-
being and thus either exempt from any collective redistribution or at least
shielded against uncompensated loss?.126
Today, the most straightforward and uncontroversial application of the right
to just compensation occurs when the government physically takes real property
through the exercise of its eminent domain power. 127 The government acts under
its eminent domain power when it appropriates privately-owned property by
ousting the owner and transferring legal title to itself in order to use the property
for some public purpose. 128 There appears never to have been any serious
question that the Takings Clause required compensation in the eminent domain
arena. 129 In fact, prior to its famous 1922 decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,130 the United States Supreme Court confronted only a handful of cases in
which owners claimed to have suffered takings in the absence of actual
appropriation of their property by the government. 131 The Court's decisions during
this time generally held that governmental acts did not require compensation absent
outright appropriation; this was so even if the acts diminished property values or
otherwise imposed costs on landowners.'3 2 The most significant early variant on
123. Lynn E. Blais, Takings, Statutes, and the Common Law: Considering Inherent Limitations on Title,
70 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 24 (1996).
124. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017-18 (1992) (quoting Penn Central
Trans. Co., 438 U.S. at 124).
125. Blais, supra note 123, at 25.
126. Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1393, 1396 (1991).
127. Rubenfeld, supra note 8, at 1081.
128. Id.; ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER, PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS § 515
(1904). Like so much else in takings law, the apparently neat distinction between government acts which
"appropriate" property and those which do not is in fact susceptible to significant confusion, and this confusion
renders rules that purport to turn on the distinction arguably meaningless. Professor Stoebuck has noted that
while eminent domain typically involves the acquisition by the government of a "property right" and police
power activity does not, it is often difficult to distinguish between acts which appear superficially to be within
the police power but which might constitute the acquisition of some kind of "property right": "[A]n ordinance
forbidding landowners to enter an abutting street would, presumably, be both a regulatory traffic measure and
an extinguishment (forced release) of the owners' easements of access upon the city's street." Stoebuck, supra
note 98, at 570-71.
129. Treanor 1, supra note 92, at 847.
130. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
131. Rubenfeld, supra note 8, at 1081.
132. See Treanor I, supra note 92, at 794-96 (citing Smith v. Corp. of Washington, 61 U.S. 135 (1858),
Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1879), and Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897)).
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this theme came from Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.133 In Pumpelly, the Supreme
Court held that the complete flooding of the plaintiff's land due to the
construction of a government-authorized dam constituted a taking despite the fact
that there had been no outright appropriation. Later, however, the Court limited
the reach of Pumpelly to cases involving actual invasion of property, rather than
any acts resulting in diminution in value.' 
34
Another principle that emerged early in takings jurisprudence was that when
the government regulated or took property to abate a nuisance, there was no
compensable taking regardless of the effect on the value of the property.' 35 As
Justice Harlan explained in Mugler v. Kansas,136 which held that a statute
outlawing the manufacture of liquor had not worked a taking of the plaintiff's
brewery despite a dramatic decline in the value of the property,
[t]he exercise of the police power by the destruction of property which is
itself a public nuisance, or the prohibition of its use in a particular
way... is very different from taking property for public use.... In the
one case, a nuisance only is abated; in the other, unoffending property is
taken away from an innocent owner.
137
Mugler and its progeny 38 are often said to embody the "nuisance exception"
or the "harm rule." For many years under this doctrine, the Court would inquire
whether the challenged regulation sought to prevent harms caused by the
proscribed property use, in which case no taking occurred, or whether the
regulation sought to obtain a benefit for the general public at the expense of the
property owner, in which case a taking occurred. 139 Harm-preventing regulations
were thought to be within the sovereign's police power and therefore not subject
to a compensation requirement. 40 The harm-benefit methodology came under
attack for reasons that now appear obvious. Determining whether a regulation
prevents a harm or extracts a benefit is a metaphysical undertaking. 14 1 The United
133. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
134. See Treanor 1, supra note 92, at 795 n.74 (citing Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
166 (1871)).
135. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); see also Jan G. Laitos, Takings and Causation, 5 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 359, 365-66 (1997) [hereinafter Laitos 1].
136. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
137. Id. at 669.
138. See, e.g., Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (holding that a law prohibiting operation of
livery stables within city limits was not a taking); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (holding that
prohibition of a brickyard in a residential area was not a taking).
139. See Laitos 1, supra note 135, at 364.
140. Paul, supra note 126, at 1435-36. For a summary of the evolution of the police power concept in
takings jurisprudence, see Jan G. Laitos, The Public Use Paradox and the Takings Clause, 13 J. ENERGY NAT.
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 9, 21-27 (1993) [hereinafter Laitos II].
141. See Laitos 1, supra note 135, at 366; Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation " Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1196-97 (1967).
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States Supreme Court ultimately rejected this approach, 142 first in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City143 and later in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council,144 in which Justice Scalia explained that the difference between
"benefit-conferring" and "harm-preventing" was "in the eye of the beholder."'
' 45
Pennsylvania Coal contained the first explicit declaration from the United
States Supreme Court that the Takings Clause was intended to protect the value
of real property, rather than just possession. 146 Most significantly, it introduced
the concept that a government regulation affecting the use of property-but not
actually ousting the owner or transferring title to the government-could go "too
far,"' 147 thereby amounting to a constitutional taking. In the ensuing eighty years,
the determination of when a regulation has gone "too far" has proved so daunting
that even the Supreme Court has acknowledged that it has approached each
takings question as an essentially "ad hoc, factual inquir[y]."'
' 48
Nonetheless, there are recurring themes. One common theme is that the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment should protect settled expectations.
49
Such protection is said to be desirable because unstable distribution of wealth
would (1) undermine the democratic system by, among other things, raising the
stakes underlying political factionalism; 150  and (2) discourage productive
investment.' 5' In a similar vein, the Takings Clause is sometimes said to reduce
insecurity among property owners by serving as a form of insurance and imposing
fiscal discipline upon the government. 152 While much economic uncertainty is
beyond the ability of government to control, 53 "there must be at work a tacit
assumption that losses which seem the proximate results of deliberate collective
142. See Laitos 11, supra note 140, at 13.
143. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
144. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
145. Id. at 1024.
146. See id. at 1014 (Justice Scalia explaining that "[plrior to Justice Holmes's exposition in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, it was generally thought that the Takings Clause reached only a 'direct
appropriation' of property, or the functional equivalent of a 'practical ouster of [the owner's] possession"')
(citations omitted); see also Sarah E. Waldeck, Why the Judiciary Can't Referee the Takings Game, 1996 WIS.
L. REV. 859, 878 (1996). But see Robert Brauneis, "The Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings'
Jurisprudence ": The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106
YALE L.J. 613, 701 (1996) (arguing that Pennsylvania Coal was neither the first regulatory takings case, nor the
first to extend constitutional protection to "nonphysical property or property as value").
147. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415-16.
148. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
149. Id. at 124-25; Blais, supra note 123, at 25-27; Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and
Constitutionalism, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 907, 914-15 (1993).
150. Sunstein, supra note 149, at 914-15.
151. Blais, supra note 123, at 26; Sunstein, supra note 149, at 914-15.
152. William K. Jones, Confiscation: A Rationale of the Law of Takings, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 5
(1995).
153. Blais, supra note 123, at 26-27.
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decision have a special counterproductive potency beyond any which may be
contained in other kinds of losses."'
' 54
Another recurring theme concerns the theory of "reciprocity of
advantage."' 155 It is simply unfair to require property owners to bear a
disproportionate share of the cost of governmental acts which broadly benefit the
public. If reciprocity of advantage underlies property regulation, such unfairness
is alleviated. 5 6 The theory, simply stated, is that if an individual suffers as a
result of a policy designed to benefit the public, the policy is fair if it provides
"reciprocity of advantage," that is, if the individual benefits in some way from
the policy. 57 In a particularly trenchant synopsis of the theory, Professor Frank
Michelman explained that the just compensation requirement should not apply
"as long as the disappointed claimant ought to be able to appreciate how such
decisions might fit into a consistent practice which holds forth a lesser long-run
risk to people like him than would any consistent practice which is naturally
suggested by the opposite decision."'
' 58
Another more modem theme arose in one of the Court's most recent takings
cases. In Lucas, passage of South Carolina's Beachfront Management Act
prevented the property owner from erecting any structures on two beachfront
parcels. 59 A state trial court found that the regulation rendered the parcels, which
had been purchased for a large sum before enactment of the legislation,
"valueless.' 160 The Court set forth two discrete types of government regulation
which the Court had previously declared "compensable without case-specific inquiry
into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint.' 16' These included cases
of government-imposed physical invasion, as in Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 62 though here the Court suggested the rule might only
apply to permanent invasions. The Court did acknowledge that its categorical
rule applied "at least with regard to permanent invasions,'' 163 suggesting such a
rule might not apply to a temporary invasion. The second category applied "where
regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land."' 164 But the
Court did not go so far as to say that all regulations depriving owners of all
economically beneficial use were necessarily compensable takings. Instead, the
Court held that if a government regulation prohibiting all economically beneficial
154. Michelman, supra note 141, at 1216.
155. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414-16; Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 134-35; Andrus v. Allard, 444
U.S. 51, 67 (1979).
156. See Blais, supra note 123, at 27-28.
157. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 40; Laitos 1, supra note 135, at 364-65.
158. Michelman, supra note 141, at 1223.
159. 505 U.S. at 1007.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1015.
162. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
163. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
164. Id.
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use of land is to be found noncompensable, the restriction "must inhere in the title
itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property
and nuisance already place upon land ownership.' 65
Another theme can be found in the Court's cases involving emergencies. It is
generally accepted that public authorities owe no compensation when they
destroy property to protect the general welfare in times of emergency.166 As the
United States Supreme Court explained in an early property destruction case:
At the common law every one had the right to destroy real and personal
property, in cases of actual necessity, to prevent the spreading of a fire,
and there was no responsibility on the part of such destroyer, and no
remedy for the owner. In the case of the Prerogative, 12 Rep. 13, it is
said: "For the Commonwealth a man shall suffer damage, as for saving a
city or town a house shall be plucked down if the next one be on fire; and
a thing for the Commonwealth every man may do without being liable to
an action." There are many other cases besides that of fire,-some of
them involving the destruction of life itself,-where the same rule is
applied. "The rights of necessity are a part of the law."'
167
This is true as a matter of tort as well as constitutional law. 168 However, some
cases held that owners were entitled to trials to determine whether the destruction
was, in fact, necessary under the circumstances.' 69 Interestingly, when a private
person takes or damages another's property in an emergency, he might be
165. Id. at 1029.
166. George C. Christie, The Defense of Necessity Considered From the Legal and Moral Points of
View, 48 DUKE L.J. 975, 995-96 nn.122-23 (1999); Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16 (1879); Surocco v. Geary,
3 Cal. 69 (1853); Dunbar v. San Francisco, 1 Cal. 355 (1850). Despite a near consensus among courts and
commentators regarding the historical existence of an "emergency exception," one prominent scholar advanced
a different position. Joseph Sax, in his classic Takings and the Police Power, argued that the main purpose
behind historical restrictions against takings without compensation was not so much to protect the economic
interests of landowners as to protect them against arbitrary or discriminatory takings. Sax, supra note 108, at
53-54. He contended, rather than describing an exception for "emergencies," early writers on takings indicated
that compensation was required only when the government seized property in emergency situations. Id. at 56-
57. According to Sax, "[tihe examples [the early writers] give suggest a principal fear of ill-considered, hasty,
or even discriminatory impositions created by the pressing necessity of the state to get a job done." Id. at 57. He
continues: "The more one examines these early explanations of the constitutional purpose of the taking
provision, the clearer it becomes that the protection afforded is most properly viewed as a guarantee against
unfair or arbitrary government." Id. at 60.
167. Bowditch, 101 U.S. at 18-19 (quoting Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dall. 357, 362 (1788)); accord
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 n.16 (quoting Bowditch, 101 U.S. at 18-19); Glenn P. Sugameli, Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council: The Categorical and Other "Exceptions" to Liability for Fifth Amendment Takings of
Private Property Far Outweigh the "Rule, '" 29 ENVTL. LAW. 939, 956-57 (1999).
168. Christie, supra note 166, at 995.
169. Conwell v. Emrie, 2 Ind. 35 (1850).
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absolved of the tort of conversion or trespass but is still required to compensate
the owner. 
70
In United States v. Pacific Railroad,171 Union Army officers ordered the
destruction of railroad bridges to prevent the advance of confederate forces.
172
The Court held that the government was not responsible for the cost of repairing
the bridges because the damage was the result of military operations.' 73 The
Court explained:
For all injuries and destruction which followed necessarily from [the
military operations] no compensation could be claimed from the
government. By the well settled doctrines of public law it was not
responsible for them. The destruction or injury of private property in
battle, or in the bombardment of cities and towns, and in many other
ways in the war, had to be borne by the sufferers alone as one of its
consequences.... The safety of the state in such cases overrides all
considerations of private loss.1
7 4
The Court distinguished its earlier decisions in which property had been
requisitioned by the army for use in war. 75 In such cases, the government was
required to pay the property owners under "the general principle of justice that
compensation should be made where private property is taken for public use.,
176
In Miller v. Schoene,' 77 the Supreme Court made additional pronouncements
about property destruction. The Court held that a Virginia law, allowing officials
to order the destruction of ornamental cedar trees that were infected with cedar
rust in order to preserve nearby apple orchards, did not effect a "taking" of the
cedar tree owners' property. 78 When a state is forced to make a choice between
the preservation of one kind of property or another, the Court held that the state
does not act unconstitutionally in doing so. 179 Moreover, the Court noted,
preferring the public interest "over the property interest of the individual, to the
extent even of its destruction, is one of the distinguishing characteristics of every
exercise of the police power which affects property.'' 80 Significantly, the Court
explained that where the government must destroy one kind of property in order
170. Richard L. Hasen & Richard H. McAdams, The Surprisingly Complex Case Against Theft, 17 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 367, 375 n.15 (1997).
171. 120 U.S. 227 (1887).
172. Id. at 229.
173. Id. at 234.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 239.
176. Id.
177. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
178. Id. at279.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 280.
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to preserve another, it is not necessary to classify the destroyed property as a
"4nuisance" in order to avoid constitutional prohibitions. 181
In Caltex, Inc., the United States military destroyed privately-owned oil
terminal facilities in the Philippines during World War II in advance of an
imminent invasion by the Japanese army.182 The terminal owners claimed the
destruction amounted to a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment.'83
The Supreme Court rejected the takings claim.' 84 Chief Justice Vinson, writing
for the Court, explained that the destruction of the terminals was attributable not
to the government, but to the "fortunes of war."'185 He noted that the terminal
owners would not have Fifth Amendment claims if the facilities had fallen into
the hands of the enemy instead of being destroyed. 86 The Court rejected the
claimants' argument that they were entitled to compensation because Army
officials had deliberated before destroying the facilities. 87 Without explicitly
resolving whether the Army's hurried decision did or did not amount to
"deliberation," the Court stated that applying the term deliberation would not resolve
the case. 188 It stated: "The short of the matter is that this property, due to the
fortunes of war, had become a potential weapon of great significance to the
invader. It was destroyed, not appropriated for subsequent use."'
89
Justice Douglas dissented, joined by Justice Black. They argued that destruction
of property to aid the war effort amounted to appropriation for the common good.' 90
Therefore, they concluded, "the public purse, rather than the individual, should bear
the loss."'
91
The most recent Supreme Court case involving property destruction was YMCA
v. United States decided in 1969. There, United States troops stationed in the Panama
Canal Zone were dispatched to the Atlantic segment of the Zone to quell rioting.
92
Prior to the troops' arrival, rioters entered and began looting and burning the
claimants' buildings.' 93 Upon arrival in the Atlantic Zone, the troops ejected the
rioters from the buildings, then moved outside. 194 Outside, the troops were subjected
to projectiles and sniper fire. Eventually they went back inside the buildings for
protection. Rioters continued their assault, and ultimately the troops retreated from
181. Id.
182. 344 U.S. at 150-51.
183. Id. at 151.
184. Id. at 156.
185. Id. at 155-56.
186. Id. at 155.
187. Id. at 154-55.
188. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. at 154-55.
189. Id. at 155.
190. Id. at 156 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
191. Id.
192. YMCA, 395 U.S. at 87.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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the buildings. After the troops retreated, the rioters continued to damage the
buildings. 195 The property owners sought recovery from the United States only for
the damage inflicted on the buildings after the troops had entered. 1
96
The Supreme Court denied recovery. Although the Court rejected the claimants'
contention that the damage occurred because of the troops' presence in the buildings,
it explicitly did not rest its holding on such finding. 197 It stated that there would be no
Fifth Amendment claim even if the damage had occurred because of the troops'
presence.198 This was because the troops had not entered the buildings under advance
plans to use them as fortresses; rather, they had entered the buildings in order to
protect them. 199 Thus, the requirement of "public use" was not met. The Court
explained:
Of course, any protection of private property also serves a broader public
purpose. But where, as here, the private party is the particular intended
beneficiary of the governmental activity, "fairness and justice" do not
require that losses which may result from that activity "be borne by the
public as a whole," even though the activity may also be intended
incidentally to benefit the public. Were it otherwise, governmental bodies
would be liable under the Just Compensation Clause to property owners
every time policemen break down the doors of buildings to foil burglars
thought to be inside.200
The Court noted that while government occupation of property ordinarily
deprives an owner of his use of the property, such deprivation of use does not
always result.20' For example, entry by a firefighter into a burning building
"cannot be said to deprive the private owners of any use of the premises. 20 2
Here, the Court concluded that "the physical occupation by the troops did not
deprive petitioners of any use of their buildings. 20 3
Destruction cases implicate the controversy surrounding the "use requirement"
set forth in the Takings Clause. Professor Jed Rubenfeld has criticized recent
Supreme Court case law as rendering the "public-use requirement" as "duplicative of
the legitimate-state-interest test that every deprivation of property must satisfy under
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses., 20 4 According to Professor
195. Id. at 87-88
196. Id. at 88.
197. Id. at 89.
198. YMCA, 395 U.S. at 89.
199. Id. at 90.
200, Id. at 92 (citations omitted).
201. Id. at 92-93.
202, Id. at 93.
203, Id.
204, Rubenfeld, supra note 8, at 1079 (citing Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242-
43(1984)).
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Rubenfeld, the words "for public-use" have come to be seen as language of
limitation, as setting forth a threshold requirement that any taking must meet in order
to be constitutional-regardless of whether compensation is paid.2 °5 Instead, he
argues, the words should be read as specifying "which governmental takings,
although otherwise constitutional, nonetheless require compensation."20 6 Under
Professor Rubenfeld's conception of the public-use requirement, state-ordered
destruction of diseased trees, as in Miller, would not require compensation simply
because the state did not "use" the trees, and for no other reason.20 7 The result of
adopting such a view would be that many takings would require no compensation,
indeed, that compensation would be required only when the state uses the property it
has taken.20 8 Joseph Sax proposed a takings test that turned on whether the
government "used" the property taken, with the key question being whether the
government was acting in its "enterprise" capacity.20 9 Under his rule, if the loss in
value is by government action "which enhances the economic value of some
governmental enterprise," then a taking has occurred.2 °
Roger Clegg has pointed out that the word "taken" "connotes property leaving one
person's hands and becoming the property of another," whereas "[d]eprivation has no
such connotation."21' Moreover, he argues, the words "for public use" bolster the
argument that extinguishment or destruction of a right does not fall within the
Takings Clause because "[h]ow can the public 'use' something that no longer
exists?
,, 212
The Supreme Court's most recent word on the subject, rendered in Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff213 declared that "public purpose" is to be broadly
construed as being "coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers. 21 4
In Midkiff Hawaii adopted a policy that transferred property rights from one group
of private citizens to another.21 5 The Court held that a "public purpose" existed
even though a small group, and not the general public, directly benefited.
21 6
Whether Midkiff is applicable in a destruction case where the property has not
been used by anyone is debatable. Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States,21 7 a
case predating Midkiff by some sixty years, speaks more directly to the issue of
"destruction." There, the claimant owned a contract entitling it to purchase a
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1080.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Sax, supra note 108, at 67.
210. Id.
211. Clegg, supra note 92, at 535-36.
212. Id. at 536.
213. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
214. Id. at 240.
215. Id. at 233.
216. Id. at 243-44.
217. 261 U.S. 502 (1923).
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large amount of steel plate at below market prices.21 8 The government
requisitioned the steel company's entire output for the year 1918, rendering
compliance with the claimant's contract impossible. 219 The claimant argued that
its property right in the contract had been taken for public use.220 The Court,
however, said that the contract had been destroyed, not taken.221 It noted that a
"taking" of the contract would demand compensation, but that "destruction of, or
injury to, property is frequently accomplished without a 'taking' in the
constitutional sense. 222 It noted cases of property destruction to prevent
spreading of a fire, destruction of diseased cattle, and destruction of diseased
trees as examples.223 The Court concluded that if property is "injured or
destroyed by lawful action, without a taking, the Government is not liable. 224
IV. ANALYSIS
As a preliminary matter, it is important to examine the strange interplay
between state and federal takings jurisprudence displayed in these cases. Each of
the five state supreme court cases applies United States Supreme Court takings
precedents-or at least cites them-even though each of the courts purports to be
applying only the state provision at issue. Certainly, no effort is made to analyze
explicitly whether the relevant state provision might have different application
than the federal Takings Clause. It is as if the courts assume the state and federal
clauses are identical in their scope.
But the courts then proceed to disregard important United States Supreme Court
jurisprudence that impedes their desired result. The most flagrant examples of this
occur in Customer Co. and Sullivant, both of which hold that their respective state
just compensation clauses apply only in connection with public improvements. This
is a narrow and anachronistic view, representing a pre-Pennsylvania Coal conception
of the reach of the just compensation requirement. This omission is made all the
more strange by the fact that the Customer Co. majority alludes in passing to the
regulatory takings doctrine, which long ago repudiated any notion that takings were
necessarily related to public improvements, and relies on Supreme Court precedent
in discussing the "emergency exception." Moreover, the Customer Co. and Sullivant
courts offer the flimsiest of justifications for their public improvement limitation-
simply noting that the relevant provision had never been applied outside the realm of
218. Id. at 507.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 508.
221. See id. at 510. The court rejected the claimant's argument that by taking all of the factory's output,
the government had essentially "taken" the contract. The court said such an argument "is to confound the
contract with its subject-matter." Id.
222. Id. at 508.
223. Omnia Commercial Co., 261 U.S. at 508-09.
224. Id.at5lO.
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eminent domain. But as Justice Baxter's dissent points out in Customer Co., this does
not necessarily mean that the provision in question can have no other application.
225
The courts in Steele, Wegner, and Kelley are willing to apply their respective
state's just compensation clauses more flexibly. But the Steele and Wegner courts
demonstrate little more of a grasp of constitutional nuance than the Customer Co.
and Sullivant courts. They essentially rest their conclusion on the argument that it
would be "unfair" for the individual plaintiffs to bear the cost of destruction
related to law enforcement. But like their colleagues in California and Oklahoma,
they make no effort to analyze any takings cases or related scholarship that might
support or undermine their position. Numerous decisions citing Armstrong have
required property owners to bear disproportionate burdens. How disproportionate
must the burden be? The Steele and Wegner courts do not say. Kelley, by contrast,
specifically applies Iowa regulatory takings precedent which calls for balancing
interests, and concludes that the state's interest in enforcing the law outweighs
the relatively limited damage suffered by Kelley. This is the most modern and
sophisticated approach taken by any of the courts.
On policy, the Customer Co. court makes the most commendable effort, pointing
out the negative consequences that would occur if police departments were required
to pay for all damage caused by their officers absent a showing of negligence. The
Steele and Wegner courts do not appear to consider this factor. Yet strong policy
reasons for limiting the reach of the Just Compensation Clause have been a key
part of the takings analysis at least since Justice Holmes's statement in
Pennsylvania Coal that the "government could hardly go on.... 2 26 What about
the societal costs that are imposed under Steele and Wegner? The courts do not
address these costs.
Despite their superficial analyses, I believe that the courts in Customer Co.,
Sullivant, and Kelley reach the correct result. To the extent that Steele would
absolve the Houston police on the grounds of a great public necessity or
emergency exception, it also reached the correct result. Destruction by public
authorities in a time of emergency does not work a taking. The emergency exception
makes sense because few of the policy concerns underlying just compensation
clauses are implicated when public officials make hasty decisions in times of
crisis.
The process failure concerns underlying the federal Takings Clause are not
triggered by emergency destruction. Because such destruction arises from random
occurrences-because the aggrieved property owners are not chosen by the
political process at all-there is little concern that a small group of politically
powerless individuals are being oppressed by a political majority. Thus, Treanor's
concern that contemporary process failure is most likely to occur when individuals
225. Customer Co., 895 P.2d at 408-09 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
226. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
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are singled out227 is of little concern. Admittedly, police policies governing the
use of force are indirect products of the political process (in the sense that law
enforcement policymakers are answerable to elected officials, or are themselves
elected officials), but because no one can predict at the time these policies are
made who exactly will be harmed by them, the singling out concern is
dramatically diminished. While it can be argued that these policies victimize
property owners as a class, property owners as a group are numerous and wealthy
enough to protect their own interests in the political process, such that singling
out is not a concern.
The concern regarding settled expectations is implicated by failure to compensate
in the police cases. This is so simply because the possibility of suffering a dramatic,
228uncompensated loss at any time is inherently de-stabilizing. However, the settled
expectations concern hinges not just on the possibility of loss, but also on the
possibility of loss arising from collective deliberation. 229 Here, there is no collective
deliberation-the loss is tantamount to an accident.
The reciprocity of advantage concept also tends to support the denial of
recovery. This is not simply because the property owners benefit from aggressive
law enforcement. Such an attenuated benefit would presumably apply in any
takings case because every citizen arguably benefits at least indirectly from
anything that generally enhances public welfare. Here, though, the randomness of
the loss combined with the extreme unlikelihood that any of these property
owners will be similarly injured again, suggests that, under Michelman's theory,
reciprocity of advantage is present. Here, a "disappointed claimant ought to be
able to appreciate how such decisions might fit into a consistent practice which
holds forth a lesser long-run risk to people like him than would any consistent
practice which is naturally suggested by the opposite decision. 230
Moreover, denying recovery on the ground that the property has not been "used"
has great appeal and firm support in the Supreme Court's Omnia Commercial
decision. Because the property has not been put to any productive use by the
government, the concerns that the government is acting to enrich itself at the
expense of the property owner are not implicated, and thus one of the major
policy reasons for the just compensation requirement does not come into play.
227. See Treanor ll, supra note 91, at 1171.
228. Coverage for destruction by governmental authorities engaging in authorized acts is excluded from
most property insurance policies. See LEO R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, 10 COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D
§§ 152.25-.28 (1998). For one explanation of why such events are excluded, see William A. Fischel, Why
Expectations and Insurance Do Not Trump Just Compensation, SE18 ALI-ABA 218 (arguing that
unpredictability makes underwriters unwilling to insure against such losses).
229. Michelman, supra note 141, at 1216.
230. Id. at 1223.
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V. CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs in these five state supreme court cases should not have been
permitted to recover under takings theories. Because of the emergency conditions
under which the destruction occurred, the policy concerns underlying the Takings
Clause have little force. While this seems intuitively unfair, the Constitution does
not prohibit all unfairness. Rather, it ensures that particular, limited potential
abuses, which were identified for historical reasons at the time of the framing,
will no longer take place. As the United States Supreme Court said more than a
century ago: "[I]t is not every hardship that is unjust, much less that is
unconstitutional. 23'
231. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 552 (1870).

